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Abstract This article illustrates in which sense
genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary
interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimen-
sions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a
continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic dis-
eases to car accidents, and different kinds of determi-
nation due to different norms of reaction. On this basis,
this article explicates in which sense the interactionist
consensus presupposes the innate–acquired distinc-
tion. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the
innate–acquired distinction is under attack in contem-
porary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are
then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic
defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual,
and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain
manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and
treatment (ideally specifying what medicine and
health care is all about) are taken into account, then
the innate–acquired distinction can be a useful episte-
mic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic
determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to
maintain a system of checks and balances in the
continuing nature–nurture debates.
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Whether or not specific diseases are considered as
innate is of utmost importance, in science as well as in
society. The design of research projects as well as
public health programs depend on the answers that are
given. Moreover, private health insurance companies
believe that so-called genetic information would be
incredibly useful to discriminate against those who
have costly genetic diseases. The existence of genetic
information nondiscrimination legislature indicates
that those who want to prevent these companies from
getting such information seem to share the same belief
in the value of the information, i.e., that genes tell you
something about you and your destiny.
This belief in the value of genetic information
indicates that in contemporary science and society
there exists a specific form of genetic determinism, or
to be more precise a tendency to believe in kinds of
genetic determination. How does this tendency come
about? This article aims to illustrate that it strongly
relies on the deeply entrenched innate–acquired
distinction, which rests on the pragmatics of medicine
and health care. Whether it makes sense to follow this
tendency depends on the case in point and on choices
that have more to do with society than with science.
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Thus, after illustrating the contemporary interac-
tionist consensus and the tenacity of the innate–
acquired distinction in a descriptive Part 1, I shall
briefly portray in Part 2 the battlefield of whether we
would do better to get rid of the bipolar innate–
acquired distinction. This leads to a limited and
preliminary defense of the bipolar frame from a
pragmatic point of view.
The Interactionist Consensus and the Tenacity
of the Innate-Acquired Distinction
If today a disease is called innate, this usually means
that it is genetic.1 The predicate ‘‘is genetic’’ is,
however, not meant ontologically: diseases are not
genes and they are not in the genes. To have a genetic
disease is meant causally: the disease is caused by
genes and is in this sense genetically determined. But
what does that mean? Almost all researchers in the
life sciences would admit that genes alone do not
determine or cause anything. They are not acting in
isolation. In this sense, everybody is an interactionist.
Everybody believes that traits of organisms are
always caused by genes and environment. New
findings in epigenetics (or epigenomics) currently
boost this interactionist consensus, but the consensus
emerged independently of these new findings and
does not change in the face of them,2 and neither does
the following. The interactionist consensus assumes a
dichotomous (i.e., exhaustive and exclusive) parti-
tioning of factors: there are genes (i.e., specific bits of
DNA) and there are environmental factors (i.e.,
everything except the DNA). Nonetheless, a dichot-
omous partitioning of traits into innate versus
acquired traits (i.e., either caused by genes or by
environment) is excluded simply because any trait is
always caused by genes and environment.
Despite this consensus that there are no traits that
are caused either by genes or by environment, the
number of those diseases that are counted as genetic
diseases increases constantly.3 I take Hedgecoe’s
(2001) term enlightened geneticization to refer to
such a seemingly paradoxical situation: nobody
believes in genetic determinism, but the number of
diseases that are counted as genetic continues to
grow. Are scientists contradicting themselves? Do
they simply pay lip service to interactionism, while
actually being biased towards genetic determinism? I
think they do neither. This paradox disappears when
we look at different kinds of what we can mean by
calling something a cause, and if we look at the
pragmatics of why we mean one thing and not the
other.
Kinds of Causes
That genes alone cannot cause anything simply
means that they are never sufficient to bring about
the respective effect. Nonetheless, they might well be
either necessary conditions for the occurrence of a
specific trait or count as probabilistic causes of a
specific trait. If something is a necessary condition of
a trait, most are prepared to call it a cause of that
trait. Many would also admit that it makes sense to
call something a cause of a trait if there is strong
statistical evidence for the causal significance of a
factor, as in sentences such as ‘‘smoking causes
cancer.’’ If a defect in a specific gene locus is taken to
be a necessary condition for a disease (as, for
instance, the gene for Huntington chorea called
huntingtin, located on chromosome 4p16.3) or taken
to be a probabilistic cause, we call the disease
genetic, and say that the (defect in the) gene causes it.
However, as long as these kinds of causes are not
sufficient, we hesitate to say that they bring about the
trait, or cause the trait; and how could they, if they
are not sufficient to do so? If there were purely
genetically determined traits, given this way of
framing the debate, then genes would be sufficient
conditions of these traits. It follows from the sheer
fact of development that there cannot be any of these
purely genetically determined traits.
1 Innateness can be (and has in the past also been) used in a
broader sense, allowing epigenetic influences to be innate as
well. However, it seems that the concept of innateness is now
mainly used in the narrow, i.e., genetic, sense just described.
For the history of the concept of innateness, see the references
in footnote 11.
2 See Jablonka and Lamb (1995) and Gilbert and Epel (2009)
on epigenetics.
3 Lemke (2007, p. 158) has reported that the number of those
diseases included as genetic in the online database Online
Mendelian Inheritance in Man (OMIM; 2000) doubled from
1992 to 1998, i.e., from approximately 5,000 to approximately
10,000. It has again doubled since then: on May 9, 2009, the
OMIM counts 19,436 genetic diseases.
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It equally follows from the sheer fact of develop-
ment that there are no traits that are completely
undetermined by genetic factors. Traits we usually
consider as acquired (as, for instance, the capacity to
write a scientific article) are also not caused by
acquired factors alone. On the contrary, lots of genes
are necessary to make it possible. Furthermore, the
situation that something is called a cause even though
it is not sufficient for the effect is not specific to
genes. The same is true for infectious diseases, which
are often described as being caused by viruses,
bacteria or other pathogenic biotic agents, in the same
way as genetic diseases are described as being caused
by (defects in) genes. However, if genetic diseases
are—strictly speaking—not caused, i.e., brought
about, by genes, then infectious diseases are not
caused by pathogenic agents either. They are not
caused by pathogenic agents since these pathogenic
agents are never sufficient conditions. In both cases,
lots of other conditions, which also play a causal role
in the generation of a trait, hover in the background.
In science, these background conditions are stuffed
into ceteris paribus clauses since they are not of
interest, for reasons depending on the context.
In the case of a complete account of genetic
determination, it would be necessary to analyze the
involved concepts of causation in much more detail.
Such a detailed account is neither possible nor
intended here.4 The aim herein is more moderate
and the strategy is similar to compatibilist discussions
of free will. These discussions proceed more often
than not without a clear concept of causation. At issue
here is not freedom, but hope. Is the hope of human
beings for prevention and treatment of diseases
compatible with genetic determination? An important
basic step for answering this question is to illustrate
what genetic determination means.
The distinction between kinds of causes (i.e.,
sufficient conditions, necessary conditions, probabi-
listic causes) is a first step in that direction and it
resolves the alleged paradox of enlightened genetici-
zation: when we call a disease genetic, we talk about
the existence of a factor (i.e., a necessary condition or
a statistically correlated one), even though we would
acknowledge (if pressed) that this is not the whole
causal story. When we talk about genetic determina-
tion, we do not make a claim about genes as sufficient
conditions of a trait. However, if genes are not
sufficient for bringing about diseases, why are
patients (and those who care for them) so interested
in genes? The reasons are pragmatic.
Preventing and Bringing About
The difference between looking for necessary condi-
tions and looking for sufficient conditions mirrors the
difference between aiming to prevent and aiming to
bring about something. If we want to prevent
something, then we look for a necessary condition
and, if possible, eliminate the potential cause. If we
want, for instance, to prevent malaria, then we try to
prevent a mosquito bite, even though the mosquito
bite is certainly not sufficient for malaria.5 If we want
to prevent something, then looking for sufficient
conditions is ineffective, and unnecessary.6 If a
mosquito bite is a necessary condition for malaria,
then preventing it is sufficient for preventing malaria.
We look for sufficient conditions only if we want to
cause something, e.g. if we want to bring about a
malarial infection in someone. Statistical causes can
be treated as being relevant for both preventing and
bringing about something, since knowledge about
them can be used for both goals. Diseases are things
we usually want to prevent, and the clinical context
of medicine as well as public health care are ideally
defined by the pragmatic goal of prevention (and
treatment, if the former is not possible anymore).
The described pragmatic frame explains why we
often do not look for sufficient conditions in medi-
cine, but it does not explain why we focus on a
specific sort of potential necessary conditions,
namely genes. It does not explain why genes are
considered the most promising candidates when we
4 Gannett (1999) provides a pragmatic account of the reasons
why genes are usually in the foreground and is a useful starting
point for an account of the concept of causation involved in
geneticization. Compare Wendler (1996) and Waters (2007).
5 See, for instance, Skyrms (2000, pp. 69–70) for this
connection between pragmatic goals and conditions.
6 The same holds for remote necessary conditions, such as the
beginning of life on Earth etc.
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search for causes. We could also focus our search on
whether specific environments are necessary condi-
tions for specific diseases, but we often do not.
According to Gannett (1999), the increasing bias
towards genes is due to a higher epistemic (and
technological) tractability in experimentation. In
addition, as she says, this tractability ‘‘fits well with
the traditional North American approach to medicine
which, in its assumption of a biological and reduc-
tionist model of disease, focuses on internal, rather
than external, factors in pathogenesis’’ (Gannett
1999, p. 359). We look for causes that we can
handle, i.e., control. Today, we strongly believe that
we can handle genes easily, now that we are able to
experiment on them, map them, screen them, and
select them via abortion and preimplantation genetic
diagnosis technology. We believe this even though
gene therapy and pharmacogenetics are still more a
promise (or spectre) than a reality. Indeed, we believe
in genes since we can now do things with them that
we cannot do as easily with environments. Try to
screen your personal environment the way we screen
DNA: it is impossible. At least as long as we do not
know which environmental aspect to focus on,
environmental factors are harder to grasp epistemi-
cally and technologically. Kitcher attributes this
situation to the ‘‘fragility of our representation of
the non-genetic causal factors’’ (Kitcher 2003, p.
289). However, it is not only the possibilities of
representation that differ. The genome is complex,
but compared with the multitude of factors making up
all the rest, i.e., the environment influencing devel-
opment, the genome is rather simple. The bits of
DNA floating around in our body might still be harder
to change in a goal-directed manner, but epistemi-
cally these bits have become much more tractable
than environmental factors, which are easy to handle
only if known to be relevant. We might well come
closer day by day to the knowledge and technology
necessary for the dystopia of eugenics, but we are as
far as ever from Skinner’s (1948) behaviorist dysto-
pia of ‘‘Walden Two,’’ i.e., designing society by
controlling the environment.
Despite these brief remarks, a full account of why
we concentrate so much on genes has to wait for
another occasion. The story goes much deeper: into
epistemological, ontological, anthropological, ethical,
as well as historical matters. However, the aim here is
simply to make explicit in which sense interactionism
goes together with the increase of genetic diseases.
The answer is: genes are increasingly taken to be
easily tractable causes (necessary conditions or
probabilistic causes) of diseases.
The Continuum of Traits and In-Principle Debates
Even though the interactionist consensus does not
assume that there is a dichotomous partitioning
between innate and acquired traits, as illustrated
above, it does assume that there is a continuum of
traits with two poles: ranging from monogenetic
diseases, such as Huntington chorea or phenylketon-
uria, to largely acquired impairments, such as the loss
of an arm due to a car accident. In between these
poles, the realm of complexity reigns: many genes
interact with each other and with environmental
factors in complex ways. Scientific progress in this
area is still quite tentative.7
If we sort diseases along this simple continuum,
we already refuse to take part in any debates that ask
whether genes are in principle more determining than
other factors. Debates over whether genes act as
informational, or programming, or have any other
property that makes them special, vivid until today in
philosophy of biology, become pointless from this
perspective. First of all, whether genes are more
determining than other factors depends on the case in
point and is a matter of degree. Second, the interac-
tionist consensus (i.e., that genes are never sufficient
conditions and that there is a continuum of traits) will
not change, irrespective of which side of such in-
principle debates we end up with. Third, nobody in
medicine is interested in an answer to in-principle
debates. The patients as well as the physicians want
to know where on the continuum a disease resides
and whether it is possible to prevent it, but they do
not want an answer to one of the in-principle debates.
This is understandable, since only the former ques-
tions touch the issue of fatalism, an important issue,
if prevention is one of your goals. In-principle
debates only tackle philosophical in-house problems
about ontology, causation, information, and so on:
7 See Schaffner (2006) for a useful introduction to the current
state of the art in molecular methods and other older tools, such
as twin studies.
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important topics, certainly, but not for the patient or
physician.
Norms of Reaction and Kinds of Determination
In addition to the continuum, and partly constituting
it, the interactionist consensus rests on a further
nondichotomizing way of putting the issue: genes
have specific norms of reaction that differ in various
ways, defining the kind of determination at issue.
Norms of reaction have been used for almost
100 years.8 They are very useful in depicting the
role of nurture. Figure 1 shows the simplest form of a
norm of a reaction. It has a flat form.
Such a flat norm of reaction shows that changes in
the value of the environmental variable (horizontal
axis) do not make a difference to the level of
expression of a trait (vertical axis), given a specific
genotype. Kitcher regards such a flat norm of reaction
as ‘‘[a] graphical representation of the simplest type
of genetic determinism.’’ As Fig. 2 illustrates, there
are further ‘‘deterministic themes,’’ i.e., kinds of
genetic determination, correlated with other shapes of
the norms of reaction.
A flat norm of reaction means that the level of
expression for a trait is constant across all the
measured environments. The other kinds of genetic
determination also express kinds of constancy. As
Kitcher (2003, p. 286) explains: ‘‘[i]n (a), the level of
expression of the trait is constant (for genotype X) in
almost all environments; in (b), the level of expres-
sion is almost constant across all environments, in (c),
despite variation in levels associated with genotypes
X and Y, the level of expression for individuals with
X is always greater than that for Y, no matter what
the environment, in (d), there is considerable varia-
tion in the level of expression but only in environ-
ments that are unhealthy.’’ These kinds of genetic
determination ‘‘admit further refinements, combina-
tions, and variations,’’ as Kitcher continues. That they
all exhibit forms of constancy justifies Kitcher’s
grouping of them together as kinds of genetic
determination.
An example should suffice to illustrate why men-
tioning these kinds of genetic determination is impor-
tant. Fukuyama, in his Our Posthuman Future, says
that the word ‘‘nature,’’ as in ‘‘human nature,’’ does
not imply ‘‘rigid genetic determination’’ (Fukuyama
2002, pp. 130–133). With this, he wants, as everybody
today, to escape the charge of ignoring nurture. After
introducing the bell curve for human height as an
example, and after admitting that average height
increased from the Middle Ages until today in all the
groups of people he considers, thanks to ‘‘economic
development and improved nutrition,’’ he concludes
that, nonetheless, ‘‘the average male–female differ-
ences are the products of heredity and thus nature.’’ He
thus ends up with nature only. In order to illustrate
explicitly why he does so is intriguing. Fukuyama not
only assumes the determinist theme (c), but he also
changes, in between, the explanandum. He started
with the individual level of development of the token
trait height and ends with talking about the inter-
individual level of differences in the expression of this
trait as a type. This change, inscribed in any move
from a developmental context to norms of reaction, is
not illegitimate, but it is important to make clear what
the move means, since it includes not only a change
from an individual to an interindividual level, but also
a change of explanandum, and thus a change in the
type of answer, and probably a change in the concept
of causation involved (e.g., from causes as develop-
mental resources to causes as difference makers).
Finally, the move includes a change of perspective—
from looking at the complex developmental process
to looking at simple correlations between genotypes
and phenotypes. It is a change to a perspective that
black-boxes the developmental process. When we do
Fig. 1 A (hypothetical) flat norm of reaction (Kitcher 2003, p.
285)
8 See Falk (2001) on the history of the concept.
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not have means to understand the complex actual
developmental process, we look at the termini only, as
Kitcher (1996, p. 242) says. In order to investigate
genotype–phenotype correlations, plotting a norm of
reaction, despite its simplifying nature, is nonetheless
fruitful, at least for practical contexts such as medi-
cine, as, for instance, Lewontin (1985, pp. 114–122)
and Kitcher (2003, pp. 285–286) argue.
The concept of norms of reaction shows, as the
simple continuum view already did, that the nature–
nurture issue is a matter of degree and that the
answers depend on the case in point. In-principle
debates are out of place. A norm of reaction also
allows us to clearly distinguish between the different
kinds of genetic determination depicted by Kitcher,
something we could not do if we only had a simple
continuum. Knowing the norm of reaction for a trait,
given a specific gene, is thus much more informative
than locating a disease at a certain position on the
simple continuum.
In addition, a norm of reaction clearly shows how
society determines whether a trait is considered as
innate (i.e., genetically determined) or not. Each
genotype has a specific and context-dependent norm
of reaction, specific for each gene and dependent on a
given range of environments. Extrapolation to and
thus prediction of the expression of the trait in
environments not covered in the norm of reaction is
not possible. This point, stressed already by Hogben
(1933) and pushed again forcefully by Lewontin
(1985), adds another dimension to the case depen-
dency already evident in the continuum view. There
simply is no general answer to whether genes or
environmental factors are more important. It depends
not only on the trait but also on the environments
considered. Whether a gene determines (in one of the
above-mentioned ways) a specific trait depends on
the environments we single out for consideration.
Since it will always be hard to epistemically single
out the most relevant environments, the value of a
norm of reaction is limited, as Kitcher (2003, pp.
288–291) states, even though, as illustrated, a norm
of reaction is more informative than simply placing a
disease on the simple continuum. Since it is our
society that determines which environments are
available at all for consideration, our society strongly
influences whether a trait is considered as genetically
determined or not. As long as we do not provide
equal education, for instance, we will not be able to
make a reliable statement about the development of
individuals in such an equal environment.
Last but not least, that norms of reaction can take
different shapes illustrates that genetic determination
does not always support fatalism. Something can be
genetically determined, even if it can be prevented
from occurring. Phenylketonuria (PKU) seems to be
Fig. 2 Deterministic
themes (Kitcher 2003,
p. 285)
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the single most often-cited example for this in the
literature on genetic determinism. It is conventionally
treated as a monogenetic disorder. As Huntington
chorea, it is at the hereditary extreme of the
continuum of traits, with severe effects on neural
development, among other things. Today, all new-
borns are screened for PKU, at least in Europe and
the USA. The disorder is held to be genetic/genet-
ically determined, even though the ailments caused
by having a genetic defect for PKU can usually be
prevented, if one manages to exclude the amino acid
phenylalanine from the diet. The norm of reaction is
not flat, but punctuated, as in Kitcher’s determinist
theme (a).
Even if the case of PKU shows that no fatalism is
implied in our talk of genetic diseases, the just-given
picture of PKU is still a simplified one. There is a
considerable amount of clinical heterogeneity (i.e.,
same mutation with different disease patterns) and of
genetic heterogeneity in PKU (i.e., different muta-
tions with same clinical pattern).9 The actual norm of
reaction of PKU would very likely be not only
punctuated, but a bit fuzzy: because of the two kinds
of heterogeneity, because of genotype–genotype
interaction (epistasis), and because of complex
genotype–phenotype interaction. The more knowl-
edge we get, the more complex the picture of the
etiology and nature of PKU becomes. However, the
point I want to make here is independent of these
complications, since the simple as well as the
complex picture support the point about the differ-
ence between genetic determination and fatalism, and
that is the important point in this article. In addition,
the complex picture seems not to disturb the bias
towards geneticization. Despite the possibility of
prevention, and despite heterogeneity, the disease is
held to be genetic/genetically determined. There are
three obvious reasons (and certainly other less
obvious ones) why PKU is still held to be genetic/
genetically determined. There is a gene, the PAH
gene, at which mutations correlated with PKU have
been identified; there is relative developmental sta-
bility over a specific range of environments; and the
physiological mechanism is understood quite well.
Be that as it may, PKU is a telling example for this
study, since it shows how society enters the connec-
tion between genetic determination and fatalism. In a
possible world that does, contrary to our world, not
allow for any environment without phenylalanine,
PKU would probably have a flat norm of reaction. It
would be a fatal destiny. However, the following also
holds, and that is the important aspect. If we currently
regard a genetic disease, or such Mendelian traits as
sex or blood group, as having a flat norm of reaction,
we might ignore a socially possible world, in which a
different set of environments would destroy the
flatness of the norm of reaction and allow modifica-
tion of the trait. The untried possible worlds are
always bountiful. If they are untried, we should not
forget to ask who gains by leaving them untried. The
important conclusion from considering norms of
reaction as part of our interactionist consensus is
thus: whatever the scientific, and often mere statis-
tical, measure with which we try to express that
environment does not influence a trait (be it Mende-
lian segregation, a flat norm of reaction, positive
predictive value, penetrance, heritability, expressivi-
ty, concordance rate, etc.), it is a measure that is
context dependent. It is dependent on the environ-
ments considered in the measure. Which environ-
ments are considered is a choice, and the choice
depends on which environments are considered as
practically possible and desirable in this world. It
depends on our socially determined preferences about
how the world should look, especially with respect to
war, crime, poverty, education, and so on.
The Three Dimensions of the Consensus
and the Innate-Acquired Distinction
It is time to summarize the account of interactionism
given here: a rigid genetic determinism has largely
been replaced by an interactionist consensus. This
consensus nonetheless embraces the above-men-
tioned deterministic themes, i.e., kinds of determina-
tion. The innate–acquired distinction appears in a
nondichotomous, nongeneralizing, and nonfatalistic
manner: first, there is no dichotomous partitioning of
9 See Kaplan (2000, pp. 13–21) and Lindee (2006) on the
history and pitfalls of the making of PKU as a genetic disease.
See Wolf (1997) for an overview of genetic and clinical
heterogeneity in a variety of diseases (such as cystic fibrosis,
Huntington disease as well as PKU, to name but a few),
challenging the idea of monogenetic diseases.
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traits but a continuum of traits, ranging from genetic
diseases to acquired traits; second, where we put a
trait along this axis cannot be generalized since it
depends on the environments considered; finally, if a
disease such as PKU is considered as a genetic
disease, it does not imply fatalism. In sum, there is no
simple dichotomy between innate and acquired traits
in our contemporary interactionist concept of genetic
determination. At the level of causal factors (rather
than traits), however, we have a very clearcut
partitioning, as the concept of norms of reaction
shows, which depends on the exclusive and exhaus-
tive distinction between genetic factors on the one
hand and nongenetic factors on the other. As
mentioned in the beginning, the nongenetic factors
include everything except DNA (i.e., epigenetic and
other cellular factors, physical environment, educa-
tion, society, culture, and so on).
The interactionist consensus, with its three con-
ceptual levels (i.e., necessary conditions or statistical
factors, continuum of traits, and norms of reactions),
is thus not sufficient to get rid of the age-old divide
between nature and nurture. This is also mirrored in
the practical context of treatment of diseases as well
as in our folk concept of innateness. The innate–
acquired distinction is quite tenacious, at least in
medicine.
The Practical Context of Treatment
Lewontin et al. (1984, p. 7), in their now classic Not
in our Genes, wrote that biological determinism
includes biologized treatment. According to them,
treatment of (allegedly) genetically determined dis-
eases is reached either by (1) elimination of ‘‘unde-
sirable genes (eugenics, genetic engineering, etc.),’’
by (2) ‘‘specific drugs (magic bullets),’’ to get rid of
the biochemical and behavioral abnormalities, or by
(3) ‘‘environmental intervention.’’ Lewontin et al.
claim that usually treatment is biologized (via the first
and second kinds of treatment), and that only lip
service is paid to the third kind of treatment.
Taking the latter for granted, it is not clear (at least
not to me) why drugs count as biologized treatment
and why environmental treatments do not. The
boundary between the second and third kinds of
treatment (drugs and environmental intervention,
respectively) is fuzzy. The boundary between the
first, i.e., genetic treatment, and the latter two is,
however, clearcut, indeed very clearcut. Giving
someone a pill is surely a different treatment than
introducing a diet, as in the case of the genetic
disorder PKU, and it certainly makes a difference for
our vision of health whether we choose the second or
the third kind of treatment, but what exactly accounts
for the difference between them seems to be not very
clear, at least not to me. The difference between
giving a pill and keeping a diet on the one hand and
eliminating the respective allele on the other hand, is,
however, very clear: one is eliminating bits of DNA,
the other is eliminating or changing the usual
consequences of these hereditary factors by changing
other factors. The clearcut dichotomous distinction
between factors, which we found already inscribed in
the norms of reaction, is thus reappearing in the
context of treatment. Furthermore, it is also consti-
tutive for the concept of innateness, a concept that
has recently been at issue in a vivid debate in the
philosophy of biology.
The Folk Concept of Innateness
A review of the current debate about the concept of
innateness lists ‘‘twenty-six candidates for [a] scien-
tific successor to the folk concept of innateness’’
(Mameli and Bateson 2006, p. 177). Each of the
finalists of these candidates refers to only one aspect
of the complex and fuzzy folk concept of innateness,
e.g., present at birth, reliably appearing during a
specific stage of the lifecycle, not possible or not easy
to change by environmental manipulation, develop-
mentally canalized, generatively entrenched, species-
typical, etc. I cannot go into the details of the debate.
Space would not suffice to do so, and it is not
necessary for the purpose of this article.10 I intend
merely to reconstruct the contemporary folk concept
of innateness, and to do so only with respect to those
aspects that are relevant for understanding the
concept of genetic determination in medicine. I thus
regard the following as a good approximation of the
folk concept of innateness:
10 Some of the candidates do not rely on an innate–acquired
distinction, such as the concept of generative entrenchment,
suggested by Wimsatt (1986, 1999), or canalization, suggested
by Ariew (1999).
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X is innate if and only if it is present at the
moment of birth (or, if that is not the case, at
least inevitably appearing during development
at a certain age, relative to a given range of
environments), and does so because of causal
factors present at the moment of conception.
Let me briefly justify this reconstruction, which is
a revised version of Stich’s dispositional account of
innateness (Stich 1975): With ‘‘if it is present at the
moment of birth’’ genes themselves and congenital
diseases are certified to be innate. Since there are
diseases that are usually regarded as innate but are
not present at the moment of birth, we need the
phrase ‘‘at least inevitably appearing during devel-
opment.’’ With this addition, the definition applies
to standard cases of hereditary dispositions, such as
PKU, which are not present at birth. The phrase
‘‘relative to a given range of environments’’ is
needed since innate dispositions such as PKU are
not inevitable occurring in all possible environ-
ments, but only relative to a given range of
environments, namely all the environments in which
phenylalanine is part of nutrition. With the phrase
‘‘because of causal factors present at the moment of
conception,’’ the definition excludes standard cases
of acquired diseases (or acquired dispositions for
diseases).
The exclusion of acquired diseases is part of the
folk concept of innateness, and this is the important
point for this article. Wendler and Ariew made this
explicit with their claim that there are diseases
associated with biotic agents that are regularly
acquired in the normal course of one’s development
but not considered as innate. Their example is the
acquisition of the bacterium Clostridium difficile (C.
diff.) (Wendler 1996, pp. 93–96; Ariew 1999, p. 133).
Humans normally get clostridia via nutrition, without
negative effects. When, however, sick people are
treated with antibiotics, then C. diff. may cause
diarrhea and other symptoms. Usually, the reaction to
such an example is that such infectious dispositions
should be excluded from being innate, even though
they are, relative to a specific set of environments,
inevitably acquired during development. Without the
addition of the phrase ‘‘because of causal factors
present at the moment of conception’’ to our
approximation of the folk concept of innateness, we
would not be able to exclude such cases.
Certainly, this folk concept has a history and could
be further questioned philosophically. The brief
account just given will neither satisfy the historian
nor the usual demands of philosophers with enough
perseverance for infinite conceptual analysis. Many
aspects of the situation I described were certainly
different in the past and are certainly different in
many other contexts in which the innate–acquired
distinction is used as well.11 One would certainly find
contexts in medicine, historical as well as contem-
porary, where there is no such clear bipolar distinc-
tion between genetic versus environmental factors or
innate versus acquired dispositions. However, I
merely claim that there are contexts in which there
is such a clear division: the conceptual context of the
interactionist consensus, the practical context of
treatment, and the conceptual context of the folk
concept of innateness. This holds even if there are
other contexts where there is no such division.
Philosophers, on the other hand, would object that
the above reconstruction fails. Given the reconstruc-
tion, we still can, in fact, count the possession of C.
diff. as innate. Our interactionist consensus enables us
to see that it is always genes (with stress on the
plural) and environmental factors that are involved in
the development of a specific trait. Thus, the acqui-
sition of C. diff. also happens because of causal
factors present at the moment of conception: it is
because of a genotype that leads to phenotypes that
ingest food and water that we acquire clostridia. If we
had different genes, e.g., Martian or plant genes, then
we might not acquire them. ‘‘In response,’’ as
Wendler writes, ‘‘one wants to say that even if we
grant that changes in the human genotype would
result in our not eating and drinking and, hence, not
possessing clostridia, the fact that I possess clostridia,
say, is environmental’’ (Wendler 1996, p. 93). I
cannot here offer a final solution to whether we
should, or how we could, consistently distinguish
between innate and acquired diseases, given our
interactionist consensus. As already mentioned in
Part 1, such a solution would require a clear account
of what causation in developmental contexts means
11 See Lomax (1977), Olby (1993), Gaudillie`re and Lo¨wy
(2001), and Lo´pez-Beltra´n (2007) on the history of the divide
in medicine.
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and whether the individual is the level of analysis that
we should concentrate on.12
The tentative reconstruction of the folk concept of
innateness was merely intended to show that we
intuitively want the definition of innateness to reflect
a rigid innate–acquired distinction. In other words,
our implicit assumption seems to be that there are two
kinds of diseases: innate and acquired ones. This is
not in contradiction to the continuum view. On the
contrary, it is the foundation for it, defining the poles
of the nondichotomous distinction. The continuum
view only adds the realm of complexity for the cases
in between the two extremes. In other words, we want
to distinguish between diseases such as PKU and
things like car accidents, despite the interactionist
consensus. And we accept that there are myriads of
cases that are hard to classify. In other words, we
accept that the bipolar distinction between innate and
acquired is vague. We accept this as we accept that
the bipolar distinction between white and black is
vague, i.e., allowing for myriad cases of color that are
neither black nor white or with respect to which it is
hard to tell whether they are black or white.
Summary
The practical context has shown that we assume there
are two kinds of treatments and thus two kinds of
causal factors; the two conceptual contexts have
shown that, based on the exclusive distinction of
causal factors (i.e., those present at the moment of
conception versus others), our folk ontology still
tends to sort traits into a bipolar scheme of innate
versus acquired diseases. The bipolar scheme does,
however, not assume two exclusive groups of
diseases, since, if pressed, we admit the continuum
of traits, despite the bipolar framing. All this shows
the deep entrenchment of the innate–acquired dis-
tinction. However, this entrenchment certainly did
not prevent philosophers from criticizing the distinc-
tion. Let us thus enter the minefield of whether one
should use the innate–acquired distinction. What
follows will not do away with the pitfalls in this
minefield, but it will provide a specific perspective
for dealing with it and some preliminary arguments in
the direction of this perspective.
The Value of the Innate-Acquired Distinction
Constructive Interactionism
Constructive interactionists (or transinteractionists)
like Oyama (1985, 2000, 2001) want to establish a
true causal parity of the factors involved in develop-
ment.13 According to them, we are wrongly appor-
tioning the complex interaction in development into
two distinct sets of factors: genes and the rest—innate
factors of development and acquired ones.14 They
object to this partitioning of developmental factors,
because it is biased in allowing us to give genes a
certain priority over the other set of factors. It is
important to be very clear about what is actually
criticized by a call for causal parity.
There are two ways of giving causal priority to
genes that are strawman-like, since nobody actually
believes in the respective priority. The first straw-
man-like claim is that genes control or determine as
necessary and sufficient conditions the occurrence of
a certain trait. This claim addresses the level of
ontogenetic development. Part 1 illustrated that a
denial of this is part of the interactionist consensus.
The second strawman-like claim addresses the level
of phylogenetic evolution: the claim that genes are
the only hereditary elements in life (i.e., the only
elements that get reliably transmitted between gen-
erations). Nobody believes in this either. We know
that cells and other organic matter as well as behavior
or culture is equally transmitted down the genera-
tions, and the evidence for epigenetic inheritance
reinforces this point of view.
12 See Wendler (1996) instead, or Gannett (1999) and Waters
(2007) for possible solutions.
13 I take the label ‘‘transinteractionists’’ from Kitcher (2003),
who mentions Lewontin, Oyama, and other developmental
systems theorists. See, for instance, the collected manifesto of
Oyama et al. (2001). Oyama herself established the term
‘‘constructive interactionism’’ (e.g., Oyama 2001) for her
position.
14 Apportioning development into two distinct sets of factors
is different from assigning to each of the distinct and
dichotomously classified factors involved in development a
separate causal impact. Unfortunately it is often not clear what
exactly is at issue when the gene–environment distinction is
attacked. Distinguishing between the two issues is important
since one can approve the former without the latter. This article
is only about the former; see Sober (1988) for the latter.
Discussing the latter would again demand a detailed account of
causation, which would far exceed the space available here.
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However, there is also a third prioritizing claim
that is not strawman-like, namely the claim that only
genes are informational entities and/or selected by
natural selection for having this or that function in
normal or healthy development, while other factors
and entities are no such units of selection. This claim
is related to the evolutionary and to the developmen-
tal level but distinct from and independent of the first
two ways of alleged prioritizing. Whether (and in
which sense) genes are the only informational entity
and/or units of selection is still a hot debate in the
contemporary philosophy of biology. I will neither
discuss the pros and cons, nor take sides. It is an in-
principle debate, and, as stated above, whichever side
we choose in these debates, it would not make a
difference for the kinds of determination at issue
here.
I want to focus on something narrower: whether
we have to get rid of a bipolar partitioning to prevent
prioritizing of genes as it is actually practiced in the
contemporary hunt for disease genes. This goal
requires analyzing whether the bipolar partitioning
between genes and environment, which is at the basis
of and inscribed in the interactionist consensus,
violates causal parity. At issue is not the usefulness,
for instance, of the norm of reaction as such, but
whether the gene–environment distinction inscribed
in the concept of norms of reaction is an example of a
habit of the mind, an intellectual habit that deserves
severe criticism, namely the entrenched custom to
regard some influences in development as more equal
than others, as Oyama (1985, 2001) has described it,
with an allusion to George Orwell’s Animal Farm.
The moment we partition developmental factors
into two dichotomous groups of factors, we assume a
very specific gene–organism–environment relation-
ship, namely what Johnston (1987) calls gene–envi-
ronment interaction and what Kitcher describes as
‘‘isolating certain properties for exploration of their
causal impact, regarding the phenotype as the product
of contributions from particular kinds of DNA
sequences, on the one hand, and from everything
else, on the other’’ (Kitcher 2003, p. 285). According
to Johnston (1987, p. 149), whose declared enemies
are the ‘‘dichotomous views of behavioural develop-
ment that oppose learned and innate behaviour, or
genetic and environmental determinants,’’ genes sim-
ply do not interact with the environment; only the
organism does. Consequently, the environment, with
which the organisms interact, starts outside of them.
Kitcher’s environment is, however, ‘‘total;’’ it
includes ‘‘everything outside the [genetic] locus (or
loci) of interest’’ (Kitcher 2003, pp. 288–291).
Kitcher, in other words, assumes a truly exhaustive
and exclusive gene–environment distinction, i.e., a
true dichotomy. Either something is an environmental
factor or it is a genetic factor. Nothing can be both and
there is no third option. Given this, the organism
seems to disappear as a separate causal agency. The
organism becomes a mere effect and thus appears only
as an explanandum but not as part of the explanans.
Given all this, Johnston surely has a point, at least
according to our folk ontology for most entities of the
biotic world, since these organisms are key agents in
the developmental and evolutionary processes. How-
ever, Johnston merely excludes his enemy by defini-
tion. Whether genes interact with the environment
depends on how you conceptualize environment, but
defining it either way does not settle the issue of
whether it makes sense to partition developmental
factors dichotomously. Furthermore, partitioning life
into genetic and environmental factors does not lead
to organisms as mere effects, since an effect can
certainly be a cause for something else (e.g., niche
construction), as Kitcher (2003) already stressed.
Fausto-Sterling (2000) provides an example of a
different route. She also criticizes gene–environment
interaction as ill-guided. She does so by comparing it
with a similar atomistic view in neurology: it is the
developmental system itself (replacing the category of
organism) that causes something, as it is the neuronal
net, and not a specific neuron or some neurons
somewhere in the brain, that causes something in the
brain. This is what Oyama (2001, p. 178) means when
she talks about a ‘‘distributed set of participants’’ that
cannot be broken apart. The responses of singular
neurons depend on the responses of others. However,
all these pleas against atomism simply lead back to the
problem of black-boxing the complex web of actual
interactions during development. The atomism exists
only in the simplified picture that we use and often
have to use, due to the lack of anything else, and with
which we obtain knowledge about the norm of
reaction. The distributed set of participants in the
complex developmental process is black-boxed in the
search for knowledge about the norm of reaction.
However, having such knowledge, which is knowl-
edge about what makes a difference for prevention, is
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quite useful, even if knowledge about the complex
developmental processes, black-boxed as they are, is
still missing.
Trying to prevent something demands different
tools than trying to understand complex holistic
development. At one point, Oyama writes: ‘‘…if
phenotypic characteristics arise only when sufficient
interactants are present in the proper place and at the
proper time, and if all these factors are therefore
given comparable causal and formative significance,
then defining heredity as the passing on of all
developmental conditions, in whatever manner, is
preferable to defining it by genetic information. This
does not require any distinction between hereditary
and acquired traits, or even between mostly heredi-
tary and mostly acquired ones; all it requires is some
degree of association of developmental influences’’
(Oyama 2000, p. 43). Well, this does not require it;
other issues such as those standard in medicine or
health care, might well. The developmental systems
theory perspective might thus turn out to be quite
useless for the pragmatics that define the clinical
context of medicine and health care. First, it is not
clear that we would always be equipped with better
norms of reactions if we knew the whole complex
developmental story. It might further our knowledge
about norms of reaction, but it might also fail to do
so. Second, in medicine, we often do not want to
wait, if we can get some decent knowledge by black-
boxing. In other words, we do not want a doctor to
tell us that it is all distributed and immensely
complex, if we need his/her help.
If we admit that black-boxing can be useful, as
Oyama (2001, pp. 181–183) does herself, then we
still did not make progress in assessing whether it is
useful to assume two exclusive sets of factors, given
the pragmatic goals involved in the endeavor.
Towards a Limited Defense
The following tentative arguments, certainly in need
of further elaboration, shall provide a first approxi-
mation of a limited pragmatic defense of the innate–
acquired distinction in medicine. These arguments
are independent of the critique just discussed. Even if
it were correct that the bipolar distinction leads to
simplifications of the causal picture of development,
this cannot prove that this simplification is necessar-
ily something we should despise. Simplicity is an
epistemic value, and in the clinical context it might
well be that it pays to accept some simplicity to have
some handles for prevention and treatment.
The question I thus focus on is in which sense the
concept of the norm of reaction, and the underlying
bipolar partitioning of causes, helps us to see that not
everything is fatalistically determined by genes,
despite its causally simplifying nature. In other
words, in which sense does the bipolar distinction
help us in the solving of what Oyama has called
‘‘issues of incidence—frequency, predictability, inev-
itability’’ (Oyama 2001, p. 181), issues that are
important, given the pragmatic goals of prevention
and treatment.
Epistemic Argument
The first argument, an epistemic argument, relates to
knowledge about specific diseases. Without ever
distinguishing in a precise way between genetic and
environmental factors, it would be hard to see, for
instance, that the genetic disease PKU is genetically
determined in a nonfatalistic sense, i.e., genetically
determined in a sense that does not imply inevitable
occurrence. We could not see, at least not as easily as
we pretend to, the difference between a flat norm of
reaction and a punctuated one, if we were not to use
the distinction between genetic and environmental
factors.15 Without the innate–acquired distinction, we
could hardly see beyond the enlightened geneticiza-
tion mentioned above: paying lip service to interac-
tionism and the continuum view would be the only
ways to express ourselves with respect to issues of
incidence. If we want to prevent a disease and
intelligently vary the environment, then we might
find a preventive effect of one of the environments,
i.e., we might find a punctuated norm of reaction.
Thus, from the pragmatic point of view, holding
genes constant and varying other factors is not a case
of giving genes priority. The bipolar partitioning of
factors inscribed in the concept of the norm of
reaction is therefore quite helpful, if we want to stress
15 This holds even if the diet for PKU was discovered earlier
than the mutations correlated with the disease. Hence, it is not
the case that molecular biology helped to find the treatment. It
was the other way round: the knowledge of treatment helped to
find the gene, as Kaplan (2000, pp. 13–21) illustrates.
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the importance of environment, e.g., for prevention of
a specific disease.
This argument is similar to an early argument from
Lehrman (1970). He is counted as one of the first
critics of the innate–acquired distinction in the 20th
century, directing his critique against Konrad Lor-
enz’s distinction between innate versus learned
behaviors. One of his points was that Lorenz’s
program is heuristically fruitless. Lorenz black-boxed
development and concentrated on developmental
stability. Finding stability is, however, according to
Lehrman, less informative than finding difference,
e.g., a difference in phenotype caused by a difference
in an environmental variable. ‘‘[A]n experimental
manipulation that causes a change in the behavioural
outcome has thrown some light on the process by
which the behaviour develops, while an experimental
manipulation that fails to cause any change in the
outcome has failed to throw light upon the nature of
the processes leading to the outcome’’ (Lehrman
1970, p. 29). It is a general characteristic and ‘‘of the
essence’’ of the experimental method ‘‘that an exper-
iment cannot be regarded as making a contribution to
the understanding of any problem unless the exper-
imenter has succeeded in finding alternate treatments
that have different effects upon the outcome’’ (Lehr-
man 1970, pp. 29–30). Even though he criticizes the
distinction between innate and acquired traits, the
distinction between innate and acquired factors (i.e.,
genetic versus environmental ones) is of heuristic
value, since we might have problems with conceptu-
alizing and finding developmental plasticity with
experiments that are not constructed on the basis of
a gene–environment distinction. The innate–acquired
distinction thus has epistemic value in finding envi-
ronmental factors that prevent diseases. Even though
Lehrman (1970, p. 20) reminds his reader that he is
(and was in his famous 1953 article) addressing the
‘‘value of the dichotomy itself,’’ he uses the dichot-
omy himself to make his claim about the fruitfulness
of the experimental method. However, he uses it only
at the level of factors and criticizes it at the level of
processes (maturation versus learning) and of traits
(innate versus learned), and so do I.
Conceptual Argument
The second argument refers to the context of
classification of diseases. Does the innate–acquired
distinction have a heuristic value for this endeavor?
When you erase a bipolar distinction from a system
of classification, you create a more inclusive set of
things. This creates two problems. First, given our
contemporary bias towards declaring more and more
diseases as genetic, the elimination of the polarity
will certainly further this tendency. The innate–
acquired distinction constantly pulls against the
contemporary bias towards calling diseases genetic.
Second, erasing distinctions increases rather than
decreases trivialization. The more general, i.e., the
more inclusive, you make a classificatory category,
the more trivial, i.e., the less informative, it becomes.
In other words, the more you include in a class, the
less it means when an element is included. You lose
depth of vision, indeed you might even literally see
less. Certainly, to keep the distinction, as a bipolar
but nondichotomous one, should not deter us from
trying to fill out the space between the poles with ever
finer categories.
Historical Argument
The third argument says that historically the distinc-
tion was necessary to keep those very factors on the
table that the critics of the distinction want to give
parity to. When, at the beginning of the 20th century,
American anthropology was in the process of
becoming an academic discipline, Alfred L. Kroeber,
one of the famous students of Franz Boas, used the
opposition between nature and nurture in the form of
heredity versus culture, to reach for anthropology
disciplinary identity and autonomy from genetics,
evolutionary theory, as well as psychology. He did so
by creating an epistemic object—culture—that, as he
thought, only anthropologists are able to study
properly. His making of culture as a new epistemic
object was similar to the making of genes, which
were postulated in the beginning of genetics as
hypothetical entities and epistemic objects that can
only by studied by genetics, then the new primus
inter pares among the biological disciplines. Kroeber
claimed that it is only through Weismann’s concept
of inheritance, which excluded Lamarckian inheri-
tance of acquired characteristics, that one can see the
decoupling between biological evolution and cultural
change. Decoupling nature from culture means in this
case that culture can change without a correlated
change in the innate characteristics of individuals.
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Culture can and did historically take off, so to say.
Culture is in this sense autonomous and relies on a
separate and parallel process of inheritance. This is
what Kroeber meant by calling culture ‘‘superor-
ganic’’ (Kroeber 1917). There are two systems of
inheritance: non-Lamarckian biological inheritance
and an autonomous cultural inheritance. Kroeber’s
case shows that the distinction has been used to
enrich scientific ontology and as a regulative ideal for
local unification, which includes constructing and
securing disciplinary boundaries and creating a
systematic coherent family of questions for cultural
anthropology.16 Most important here, Kroeber’s case
illustrates that the innate–acquired distinction did not
simply further (by itself) the historical predecessor of
contemporary genetic determinism or any other view
that gives genes priority over other factors. Histor-
ically, the innate–acquired distinction did not prevent
parity of factors. Kroeber’s case shows that the
opposite is the case. The innate–acquired distinction
furthered the most radical opposition to racism, the
historical predecessor of genetic determinism. How-
ever, it has to be mentioned that the parity Kroeber
helped to establish (i.e., that there are two separate
systems of inheritance) was reached with a price.
Developmental interactions were totally out of sight
and thus black-boxed. However, as the subsequent
history has shown, interaction was easily brought in
again later. That both factors were on the table as
distinctive factors, as distinctive epistemic categories,
was a precondition for giving them equal importance,
parity, not only in evolutionary terms (as systems of
inheritance) but also in developmental terms (as
causal factors in development).
Conclusions
In sum, the innate–acquired distinction helped to put
and keep on the table those very factors to which
critics of the distinction want to give parity to. It
helped establish nongenetic factors as a new episte-
mic object (culture as a system of inheritance and
change) and helped install a new discipline that is still
considered as crucial to get closer to a more detailed
understanding of at least some of the environmental
factors influencing human development: those sub-
sumed under cultural influences. History shows that
the bipolar distinction was, so to say, similar to an
epistemic ladder. Whether it is a Wittgensteinian
ladder, a ladder that we now—after we have climbed
it—should throw away, as some might press us to do,
is another issue. However, as I indicated with the
epistemic and the conceptual argument, I doubt that
we should. It would not help us further, neither to
establish causal parity, nor to understand why genetic
determination does not mean fatalism, nor in actually
finding means to prevent diseases.
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